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Historically, rational choice theory has focused on the utility maximization principle to describe
how individuals make choices. In reality, there is a computational cost related to exploring the
universe of available choices and it is often not clear whether we are truly maximizing an underly-
ing utility function. In particular, memory effects and habit formation may dominate over utility
maximisation. We propose a stylized model with a history-dependent utility function where the
utility associated to each choice is increased when that choice has been made in the past, with a
certain decaying memory kernel. We show that self-reinforcing effects can cause the agent to get
stuck with a choice by sheer force of habit. We discuss the special nature of the transition between
free exploration of the space of choice and self-trapping. We find in particular that the trapping
time distribution is precisely a Zipf law at the transition, and that the self-trapped phase exhibits
super-aging behaviour.
I. INTRODUCTION
A key assumption in rational choice theory is that indi-
viduals set their preferences according to an utility max-
imization principle. Each choice an individual can make
is assigned a certain “utility”, i.e. a quantity measuring
the satisfaction it provides to the agent and frequently
related to the dispassionate forecast of a related payoff.
This framework is often accompanied by the assumption
that the agent considers all available choices present to
her/him, weighs their utilities against one another, and
then makes her/his choice taking into account possible
constraints, such as a finite budget.
A number of criticisms to this view of human behaviour
have emerged, with e.g. Simon [1] as a key figure high-
lighting that individuals may be “satisfiers” rather than
pure optimisers, in the sense that there is both a compu-
tational cost and a cognitive bias related to considering
the universe of available choices. Sometimes finding the
optimum of the utility function can itself be such a com-
putationally hard problem that even the most powerful
computers would not be able to find it in a reasonable
amount of time. This led to the idea of bounded ratio-
nality as a way to model real agents [2–5]. More recently,
Kahneman [6, 7] pointed at what he considers to be sig-
nificant divergences between economics and psychology
in their assumptions of human behaviour, with a spe-
cial emphasis on the empirical evidence of the cognitive
biases, and therefore the irrationality, that guides indi-
vidual behaviour. A pervasive effect, for example, is that
the utility of a certain choice strongly depends on the
choice made by others. These so called “externalities”
can lead to interesting collective effects, where choices
made by agents synchronise and condense on a small
∗ jose.moran@polytechnique.org
subset of choices, or lead to confidence crises – see for
example [8–12].
An interesting idea developed in [13] is the fact that
the utility associated to a certain decision may depend
also on our memory if it has already been made in the
past. Here we propose a simple model that encapsulates
this idea, and show that this too can lead to choices that
do not necessarily conform to their “objective” utilities,
but are rather dominated by past choices alone. This is
related to what economists call “habit formation” [14–
19]. Memory effects chisel the utility landscape in a way
that may render objectively sub-optimal choices subjec-
tively optimal. In the case of sufficiently long range mem-
ory, agents may, in a self-fulfilling kind of way, become
“trapped” forever in a certain choice and stop exploring
alternative choices.
As a practical example, one may imagine a situation
where one must choose where to have lunch every day.
Standard rational theory dictates that we ought to scru-
tinize every restaurant, eatery and cafeteria, taking into
account our personal tastes and the costs associated with
going to any of these places. In contrast, we want to
model the fact that habit may take over: instead of seek-
ing to maximize a certain objective cost function, we are
likely to persist in going to a specific place just because
we are used to it. Anecdotal evidence shows that this is
indeed what often happens in practice!
Our model assumes that the utility landscape is af-
fected by past choices, with a memory kernel that decays
with time. Agents can change their decision using a logit
(or Metropolis) rule, parameterised by an “intensity of
choice” β that plays the role of the inverse temperature in
statistical physics. This type of model belongs to a wide
class of so-called “reinforcement” models, which contains
Polya Urns, Reinforced Random Walks, Elephant Walks,
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2etc. – for a review see [20] and references therein.1 Such
models have also gained traction in the economics lit-
erature, where positive reinforcement of certain choices
made by agents are shown to impact the emergence of
certain macro outcomes and structures [23, 24].
After properly defining our model, we provide analyt-
ical arguments to confirm the intuition that sufficiently
strong memory effects, coupled with the optimization of
the subjective memory-induced utility, can lead to “self-
trapping”, i.e. the agent sticks to a choice whose objec-
tive utility is not necessarily maximal, simply by force of
habit. We confirm our result via numerical simulations
that explore different topologies for the space of different
choices. We discover a particularly interesting dynam-
ical transition when the memory kernel decays as the
inverse of time, with rather unusual scaling and super-
aging properties. We finally propose possible extensions.
II. A SIMPLE MODEL
Consider a set of N discrete choices, labeled (xi)1≤i≤N ,
to which we assign an utility − a measure of the value an
individual assigns a given choice. The perceived utility
of site xi and time t is postulated to be:
U(xi, t) = U0(xi)
(
1 +
t∑
t′=0
φ(t− t′)1x(t′)=xi
)
, (II.1)
where the first term on the right-hand side is the intrin-
sic, or objective utility of the choice, while the second
accounts for memory effects, affecting the utility of that
choice for the only reason that the individual has picked
it in the past.2 The decaying memory kernel φ encodes
that more recent choices have a stronger effect, and x(t)
denotes the choice of the individual at time t. Hence, past
history “chisels” the utility landscape, in a way similar
to ants leaving a pheromone trace that guide other ants
along the same path, or rivers creating their own bed
through erosion. Note that in most reinforcement ran-
dom walk models reviewed in [20], infinite memory span
is assumed, i.e. φ(t) = constant, while we will be mostly
concerned here with decaying memory kernels.
The sign of the kernel φ separates two different cases:
φ < 0 indicates a situation where an individual grows
weary of his past choices, while φ > 0 corresponds to the
case where an individual becomes increasingly endeared
with them. In agreement with intuition, the former case
leads to an exploration of all the choices unless the op-
timal choice has an utility too far apart from the rest to
be sufficiently affected by the kernel. In all that follows
1 For recent developments, see also [21, 22].
2 One may also think, in the physicist’s language, of an energy
landscape (akin to minus the utility) where the energy of a given
site or configuration increases or decreases if the system has al-
ready visited that site.
we focus on the more interesting case φ ≥ 0. The rea-
son behind studying such utility reinforcement lies in the
behavioural idea that people tend to prefer what they
already know, thus paving the way for “habit formation”
as in [25], see also [15–19] and [11]. We then consider the
following dynamics. An individual, standing by choice xi
at time t, draws an alternative xj from a certain ensem-
ble of “nearby choices” ∂i, e.g. the set of neighbors of i
in a graph G, with probability:
Txi→xj =
1xj∈∂i
Ni , Ni :=
∑
j
1xj∈∂i , (II.2)
where Ni is the number of neighbours of i. Restricting to
nearby choices is a parsimonious way to model adapta-
tion costs, that penalize large decision changes. However,
our framework is quite versatile since the topology of the
graph G is arbitrary, and we will consider different cases
below.
The target choice xj is then adopted with the logit
probability, standard in Choice Theory [26]:3
p(xi → xj) = 1
1 + eβ[U(xi,t)−U(xj ,t)]
, (II.3)
where β is called the “intensity of choice” and accounts
for the degree of rationality (it is the analogue of the in-
verse temperature in statistical mechanics). Indeed, as
long as 0 < β < ∞, the agent is more likely to switch
whenever U(xj , t) > U(xi, t) (optimizing behaviour), but
the probability to pick a choice with a lower utility is
non-zero, which encodes for bounded-rationality (or un-
certainty about the true utility) in the economics litera-
ture. In the β → 0 limit (equivalent to the infinite tem-
perature limit in physics) the agent explores the whole
space of possible choices without taking their utility into
account. In the opposite limit β →∞ (or zero tempera-
ture) the agent has a greedy behaviour and only switches
to choices with a higher utility, but this also implies that
he/she may stay in a local maximum instead of taking
the chance to explore all available possibilities. An illus-
tration of these dynamics is given in Fig. 1.
When φ = 0, the dynamics is that of the Metropolis-
Hastings algorithm used to sample the Boltzmann-Gibbs
distribution [27, 28]. The stationary state of the dynam-
ics is such that the probability to pick choice xi is propor-
tional to NieβU0(xi). This can by itself lead to interesting
phenomena depending on the statistics of U0. For exam-
ple the study of the Random Energy Model [29, 30], for
a finite value of N and for Gaussian utilities of variance
σ2, shows that for β > βc =
√
2 lnN/σ, the probability
measure condenses on a small number of choices, much
smaller than N .
3 For non-trivial trapping to emerge, we consider graphs without
singletons, that is to say that all sites have a non-empty set of
neighbours that are different to itself.
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FIG. 1. Schematic representation of our problem at a given
time t. The plot on the top depicts the case of random “ob-
jective” utilities U0(x), while the one on the bottom shows
the situation where they are uniform U0(x) = U0. In both
plots, the solid black ball represents the choice made at time
t, while the empty ball represents the choice made at time
t− 1. Both correspond to a simulation run with a power-law
kernel φ(t) ∝ (1 + t)−γ with γ = 1.5 and β = 0.2, on a fully
connected graph.
III. NON-ERGODICITY & CONDENSATION
OF CHOICES
Adding the kernel introduces the possibility that the
agent gets stuck in a non-optimal choice exclusively
through memory effects: staying a long time in a given
choice self-reinforces its utility, thereby increasing the
likelihood to stay there and leading to non-ergodic dy-
namics. To study the possible condensation or trap-
ping induced by memory alone, we restrict ourselves
to the case where U0(xi) = 1, ∀i. The interplay be-
tween memory-induced trapping and utility heterogene-
ity is quite interesting in itself, but we leave it to future
investigations.
We consider an agent starting from a given choice x0
at time t = 0 and follow his/her evolution for times t =
1, . . . , T with T sufficiently large. We then compute the
empirical state histogram pi =
∑
t 1x(t)=xi/T and define
the order parameter h, in a similar way to the inverse
participation ratio used in condensed matter physics [31,
32] or to the Herfindahl index in economics [33], as:
h :=
N∑
i=1
p2i . (III.1)
This parameter indicates how the agent has explored the
space of possible choices: if all choices were visited with
equal probability then one has immediately pi = 1/N
and thus h =
∑
i 1/N
2 = 1/N . On the other hand if the
agent was stuck in a single choice j, then pi = δi,j and so
h = 1. Therefore 1/h gives an order of magnitude of the
number of different choices picked by the agent during
time T . In practice, we average h over a large number
of trajectories and starting sites x0, to obtain an average
parameter 〈h〉. For a set of simulations on a graph G
with N choices and lasting a time T , we therefore define
the critical value βc, defining the crossover between h =
O(1/N) and h = O(1) as the value for β that maximizes
the variance of h over different trajectories.
An important question is whether βc corresponds to
a true transition or to a mere crossover. This depends
on the L1 norm of the memory kernel, |φ| = ∑∞t=0 φ(t).
Suppose that this norm is finite. Then if the agent has
been stuck in a given site i for a time t  1, we can
approximate its utility by U0(1 + |φ|). The difference in
utility with the neighbouring choices thus remains finite.
For any finite value of β, the probability to leave that site
is non-zero, and therefore the individual will eventually
pick a different choice. The time for this to happen is
however of the order of exp(βU0 |φ|). If this time is much
longer than T , we will in fact measure h ∼ 1, even though
running the trajectory for a longer time would result in
h = O(1/N). Hence in this case βc is a crossover that
depends on T as ln(T )/(U0 |φ|).
A more interesting situation (at least from a theoretical
point of view) is when |φ| = ∞. As we will show below,
there exists cases where βc corresponds to a true phase
transition and is independent of T (when T is large).
IV. MEAN FIELD APPROXIMATION
In order to draw further analytical features, we start by
looking at a mean-field approximation. This means that
we take the graph G to be fully connected with Txi→xj =
1/(N − 1) and in the limit N →∞.
We now formalize the argument previously sketched.
If the individual started first at a given choice corre-
sponding to node i, then the probability P>(τ) that
he/she remains there up to a time τ is given by the
product over t ∈ J0, τ − 1K of the probabilities not to
leave the site between times t and t + 1, pstay(t). Now,
pstay(t) = 1− pleave(t) with:
pleave(t) =
∑
j∈∂i
Txi→xj
1
1 + eβ[U(xi,t)−U(xj ,t)]
. (IV.1)
For the fully connected graph, this expression simplifies
to4 pstay(t) =
[
1 + e−βΦ(t)
]−1
, with Φ(t) = U0
∑t
0 φ(s).
4 In the general case in which the agent started in a “site” different
4It follows that:
P>(τ) =
τ∏
t=0
[
1 + e−βΦ(t)
]−1
≈ e−I(τ), (IV.2)
with I(τ) :=
∫ τ
0
dt ln
[
1 + e−βΦ(t)
]
, where we have re-
placed discrete sums by integrals. Equation (IV.2) de-
termines the distribution of the “trapping” time τ that
the agent spends stuck on a certain choice. Its nature
will entirely depend on the behaviour of the integral I(τ)
when τ →∞.
Short Term Memory
Consider first the case where limt→∞Φ(t) = |φ| <
+∞. Then I(τ) ≈ λτ for τ →∞, with
λ := ln
[
1 + e−β|φ|
]
. (IV.3)
This means that the trapping time distribution decays
exponentially fast for large τ , with an average trapping
time 〈τ〉 approximately given by 1/λ. For sufficiently
small λ, we recover the qualitative criterion of the previ-
ous section by setting Tλ ∼ 1. But the dynamics remains
ergodic when T →∞.
Long Term Memory
Suppose now that φ(t) decays sufficiently slowly for
large t for |φ| to diverge. For definiteness, we will focus
on power-law kernels:
φ(t) =
C
(1 + t)γ
. (IV.4)
When γ > 1, |φ| is finite and we are back to the previous
case. Hence we restrict to γ ≤ 1. When γ < 1, one finds
that Φ(t) ∝ t1−γ for large t. Hence I(τ) converges to
a finite limit I∞ for large τ . This means that there is
a finite probability P∞ = e−I∞ that the choice is made
forever. When γ = 1, Φ(t) ≈ CU0 ln t for large t. This
leads to three further sub-cases:
1. When βCU0 > 1, I(τ) again converges to a finite
limit when τ →∞, i.e. decisions self-trap forever.
2. At the transition point, defined as β?c = (CU0)
−1,
one finds that P>(τ) decays as τ
−1, i.e. the trap-
ping time distribution is a Zipf law, τ−2. This is
from i and then got stuck in i, one wants to replace the right-
hand side by an average of the logit rule over the utility gaps
U(xi, t)− U(xj , t). However, as N → ∞ it is very unlikely that
a site that was previously picked is chosen again. We can thus
safely replace the average gap by the gap with the base level
U0 = 1.
the marginal case that appears in several models of
aging in the literature [34, 35]. For a finite observa-
tion time T , the average trapping time grows like
lnT .
3. When βCU0 < 1, I(τ) behaves for large τ as
exp(−τ b/b), where b = 1−βCU0 > 0. The average
trapping time 〈τ〉 is thus finite. A careful anal-
ysis shows that 〈τ〉 diverges as b−1 when b → 0,
but higher moments 〈τk〉 with k > 1 diverge much
faster, as exp((k − 1)/b), i.e. according to the so-
called Vogel-Tamman-Fulcher law, see e.g. [36].
Let us summarize the above results. When the ker-
nel φ decays fast enough, there is a crossover regime in
β between free exploration of the space of choice and
trapping. The crossover value of β depends on the obser-
vation time T and is given, using Eq. (IV.3) for T large,
by
βc =
lnT
|φ| . (IV.5)
When memory is long ranged, and described by a power-
law kernel with decay exponent γ, there exists a gen-
uine transition when γ = 1 between a free exploration
regime and a (non-ergodic) trapped regime at a T in-
dependent value of β that we shall henceforth call β?c .
When β > β?c or γ < 1, there is a non-zero probability
to get trapped in the same decision forever. The charac-
teristic time for changing decision is of the same order of
magnitude as T itself, a phenomenon called “aging”, see
e.g. [35, 37], on which we will comment further below,
see Fig. 4. Note finally that for γ = 1, our mean-field
analysis predicts that while the average trapping time
diverges as (β?c −β)−1, all higher moments diverge much
faster, as ∼ exp(A/(β?c − β)).
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We have conducted simulations using a long-range
memory kernel given by Eq. (IV.4) with γ ∈ [1;∞[.
For numerical convenience, we represent φ(t) as a super-
position of exponentials as done in [38]. We have con-
sidered a variety of different graph topologies G: fully
connected graphs, one dimensional chains, and finally
Watts-Strogatz small world networks. Without loss of
generality, we set U0 = 1 as this simply corresponds to a
rescaling of β.
Figure 2 (Left) shows the value of βc, determined as
the maximum of the variance of h, as a function of T
for two different topologies (one dimensional and fully
connected) and two different values of γ ∈ {1, 1.5}. Our
results show excellent qualitative agreement with the the-
oretical prediction for the two topologies, in particular
Eq. (IV.5) in the γ > 1 case, although there is an overall
factor needed to account for the one-dimensional data.
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FIG. 2. Left: critical βc as a function of lnT for γ = 1 and
1.5, N = 105 and different topologies. (Fc stands for fully
connected, while 1D is the one-dimensional chain). Black
lines correspond to the prediction of mean-field theory. Right:
dependence of the critical intensity of choice β?c on the pa-
rameter p of Watts-Strogatz networks, for T = 5 · 103 and
N = 2 · 103.
One can actually interpolate between the two situ-
ations by considering Watts-Strogatz small-world net-
works [39], with a rewiring parameter p such that p = 0
corresponds to one-dimension chains and p = 1 to the
fully connected graph. Figure 2 (Right) shows the value
of β?c as a function of the rewiring parameter p of interpo-
lating between between one-dimensional chains for p = 0
and the fully connected graph for p = 1. The parame-
ter p therefore allows to interpolate between a situation
where one may only do local jumps to a situation where
one can go anywhere. As expected, β?c increases with p,
as it is easier to get trapped in less connected graphs,
where the same choice is revisited more often.
We now study more carefully the behaviour of the or-
der parameter h close to the transition point β?c , when
γ = 1, both for one dimensional chains and for the fully
connected graph. We choose N = 105 henceforth, such
that finite size effects are negligible in the range of T that
we explore. Figure 3 suggests that as T →∞, 〈h〉(β) ap-
pears to slowly converge to a step function that is zero
0 1 2 3 4 5
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β
FIG. 3. Order parameter h as a function β for N = 105,
γ = 1 and different values of T . Left: Fully connected graph,
for which a step function is approached as T−1/3. Right: One-
dimensional chain geometry, for which we cannot exclude that
h remains a continuous function of β when T →∞.
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FIG. 4. Aging function 1 − P(t, T ) as a function of t/T β/β?c
in a fully connected graph with N = 10000, with β?c ≈ 1.5
and β = 3.5. Eq. (VI.1) predicts that P(t, T ) ≈ 1 − t/T β/β?c
when t T (dashed line).
for β < β?c and unity when β > β
?
c , at least in the fully
connected case where the speed of convergence is found
to be ∼ T−1/3. In the one dimensional case, one cannot
exclude with the available data that this limiting function
remains continuous when T →∞.
VI. AGING
Finally, let us be a little more specific about the mean-
ing of self-trapping for finite T when β > β?c . The correct
statement is that the system ages, in the following sense
[37, 40]: assume that the agent’s choice at time T is a
certain xi and ask: What is the probability P(t, T ) that
the agent has never changed his/her mind between T and
a later time T + t? In the free exploration phase β < β?c ,
this probability is, for large T , independent of T : the pro-
cess is time-translation invariant. In the trapped phase
β > β?c , P(t, T ) can be estimated by appropriately gen-
eralizing Eq. (IV.2). The result takes the following aging
form (see Fig 4):
P(t, T ) ≈ exp
(
1
a(T + t)a
− 1
aT a
)
, a =
β
β?c
− 1 > 0.
(VI.1)
Note that in the regime t  T , P(t, T ) is a function
of t/T 1+a (precisely 1 − P(t, T ) ≈ t/T 1+a, see dashed
line in Fig. 4), a regime called super-aging [41] since the
effective time for changing one’s mind grows as T β/β
?
c ,
i.e. faster than the age T itself. This is quite interesting
since we are not aware of simple models leading to such
a super-linear aging behaviour. Hence, memory effects of
the type discussed here might very well be an interesting
lead to interpret experiments that show such a super-
aging behaviour, such as those reported in [42].
Right at the transition point β = β?c , one finds simple
aging, i.e. a scaling function of t/T :
P(t, T ) ≈ 1
1 + tT
, β = β?c . (VI.2)
6Asymptotics of
∑T
t=0 φ(t) |φ| <∞ ln(T ) T 1−γ , γ < 1
Asymptotics of P>(τ) e
−λτ with λ = ln
[
1 + e−β|φ|
] • β > β?c (trapped regime): P∞ > 0• β = β?c (critical regime): τ−1
• β < β?c (ergodic regime): exp(−τ b/b),
with b = 1− β/β?c
P∞ > 0
(trapped)
Aging P(t, T ) Trapping & aging for T  eβ|φ|
• β > β?c super-aging t ∼ T β/β
?
c
• β = β?c normal-aging t ∼ T
• β < β?c equivalent to |φ| <∞
Quasi-frozen
relaxation
TABLE I. Summary of the different dynamical regimes.
When the kernel has a finite norm and leads to a crossover
rather than a true transition, aging will take place when-
ever T  eβ|φ| but revert to a normal time transla-
tion dynamics when T  eβ|φ| (see [40] for a similar
situation). When γ < 1, on the contrary, relaxation
is quasi-frozen for large T , in the sense that P(t, T ) ≈
1− t exp(−βU0T 1−γ) when t T γ .
VII. CONCLUSION
Although quite simple, our model shows that non-
trivial choice distortion effects can emerge through mem-
ory or self-reinforcing mechanisms. Our main result is
that the addition of memory effects can hinder the full
exploration of all choices by the agent, and it may even
cause him/her to leave a substantial number of possi-
ble options totally unexplored. The emergence of ag-
ing properties also shows that including memory effects
in agents’ preferences can lead to non-ergodic dynamics,
when ergodicity is a crucial assumption to many models
in economics. Table I summarises our results.
Several extensions can be thought of, and would be a
sensible way to incorporate more realism into the model.
As we mentioned, we have explored here the case where
the objective utility landscape U0(x) is totally flat, in
a way to highlight the effects induced by memory alone.
Reintroducing some heterogeneities in U0(x) would allow
one to study the competition between “landscape trap-
ping” and “memory trapping”, with possibly interest-
ing transitions between the two. Another direction is to
introduce many agents with interactions between them,
meaning that the subjective utility may also depend on
what others are doing. Here again, one expects some in-
teresting competition between herding induced conden-
sation of choices and memory effects. In particular, the
combined effect of imitation of the past and imitation of
peers may generate collective self-fulfilling prophecies.
Another direction one could explore is when the graph
G defining the topology of the space of choices is itself
time dependent – see [43] for a step in this direction.
For example, the neighbourhood of each choice could be
itself affected by past choices, or some new choices, not
present initially, could present themselves later in time
(for example, the opening of a new restaurant).
In all these cases, the basic question is whether mem-
ory effects, habit formation, or herding completely dis-
tort the choices dictated by their objective utilities or
not. Such distortions may have very significant economic
consequences at the macro level.
From a purely theoretical point of view, revisiting re-
inforcement models considered in the literature [20] with
a power-law decaying memory kernel could lead to new
interesting transitions of the type discussed above. In
particular, the super-aging behaviour reported in the
trapped phase might have applications much beyond the
present setting.
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